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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. : 
IRENE GARCIA, : Case No. 20120147-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : Appellant is incarcerated. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Appellant Irene Garcia appeals from a Sentence, Judgment, Commitment for a 
conviction of Distribution of or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance, a first 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii) (2007); in the Third 
Judicial District, in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Vernice 
Trease, presiding. Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78A-4-103(2)(j) (2008). See Addendum A (Sentence, Judgment, Commitment). R.175-
77. 
ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue: Whether there was insufficient evidence presented by the State to show 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Garcia knowingly and intentionally distributed or 
arranged to distribute a controlled substance. 
Standard of Review: In sufficiency of the evidence cases, this Court will "review the 
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ^[15, 63 P.3d 94. It 
"will reverse a jury conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." Id. (citing State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)). 
[Notwithstanding the presumptions in favor of the jury's decision this 
Court has the right to review the sufficiency of the evidence to support the 
verdict. The fabric of evidence against the defendant must cover the gap 
between the presumption of innocence and the proof of guilt. In fulfillment 
of its duty to review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably 
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict, the reviewing 
court will stretch the evidentiary fabric as far as it will go. But this does 
not mean that the court can take a speculative leap across a remaining gap 
in order to sustain a verdict. 
Id. (quoting Petree, 659 P.2d at 444-445). 
Preservation: Ms. Garcia preserved this issue by making a motion for a directed verdict. 
R.191: 202-03; see State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, ^ 11, 14, 10 P.3d 346 (uAs a general 
rule, to ensure that the trial court addresses the sufficiency of the evidence, a defendant 
must request that the court do so."). Specifically, trial counsel argued in her motion for a 
directed verdict that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Ms. Garcia had the 
intent required to show she intentionally and knowingly distributed or arranged to 
distribute a controlled substance. R. 191:202-203. See State v. Noor, 2012 UT App 187, 
^5 ("In order to preserve an issue for appeal, it must be . . . specifically raised such that 
the issue is sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness before the trial court . . . [so as 
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to give] the trial court an opportunity to address the claimed error, and if appropriate, 
correct it.9'). Although Ms. Garcia preserved this issue, if this Court finds preservation 
inadequate, it can be reviewed under the plain error doctrine. See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 
m 12-15. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provision is determinative of the issue on appeal. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (Supp. 2010) 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(4) Prohibited acts D - Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not 
authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under 
this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, 
Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to 
the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4) if the trier of fact finds 
the act is committed: 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
An Information was filed December 17, 2010, charging Ms. Garcia with 
Distributing/Offering/Arranging the Distribution of a Controlled Substance, a first degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(ii)(2010). R.1-3. A preliminary 
hearing was held February 10, 2011, binding Ms. Garcia over on the charged offense. 
R.30-31. 
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A jury trial was held on October 24, 2011. R.128-30; 191. After the State rested 
its case, Ms. Garcia made the court aware she would be making a motion for a directed 
verdict. R. 191:187. After Ms. Garcia's witness testified, counsel made a motion for a 
directed verdict, which was denied. R.191:202-203. The jury returned a guilty verdict on 
the charged offense. R.164; 191:254. Ms. Garcia's conviction was subject to the 
statutory enhancement under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(b)(i) and filed a 402 Motion 
to strike the enhancement. R. 167-170. The trial court granted Ms. Garcia's 402 Motion. 
R.175. Ms. Garcia was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than five years to 
life in the Utah State prison, suspended, and 365 days in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
R.175. 
Ms. Garcia filed a timely appeal. R. 178-179. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Pioneer Park, located at 350 West and 400 South in Salt Lake County, is situated 
near various neighborhoods, urban attractions, and community services catering to low 
income individuals. R.191:141-2; 214-15. The Wiggam Center is within a block of the 
park and offers resources to Hispanic individuals attempting to find employment. 
R.191:154; 190-191. Looking to obtain a copy of her birth certificate needed to attain 
employment, Ms. Garcia sought assistance from the Wiggam Center. R.191:190. 
On December 9, 2010, sometime between 9:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., Ms. Garcia 
sipped coffee with her niece—a morning routine they shared. R. 191:189-91. Ms. 
Garcia's niece, Cynthia Nicole Garcia ("Cynthia"), lived in the apartment above her 
home, and they saw each other on a daily basis. R.191:189. On that morning, the two 
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women discussed their plans for the day. R. 191:190. Visibly in a good mood, Ms. Garcia 
told Cynthia that she planned to ride her bicycle to the Wiggam Center to check on the 
status of her birth certificate. R. 191:190-191. Ms. Garcia was looking for full-time 
employment and Cynthia had helped her apply online for two warehouse jobs looking to 
hire. R.191:192. Ms. Garcia did not mention that she was going to stop anywhere along 
the way, and planned to hurry home so she and Cynthia could go Christmas shopping 
later that morning. R. 191:189-193. Cynthia testified that her aunt left her home around 
9:30 a.m. and did not plan to be gone for too long—as the Wiggam Center was only a 
fifteen to twenty minute bike ride away from their home—and planned to return within 
anhour.R.191:191; 193. 
While most individuals frequent Pioneer Park to enjoy its amenities or travel 
through it to reach a surrounding destination, the Park is also known to be a high drug 
trafficking area. R.191:141; 214-215. Consequently, narcotics Detective Christopher 
Johnson often worked in the Park in an undercover capacity. R. 191:141. 
On December 9, 2010, at some time between 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m., Detective 
Johnson arrived at Pioneer Park. R.191:141-142; 162. The detective, who was working 
undercover at the time, walked inward toward the thickest concentration of people. 
R. 191:161 -162. North of the bathroom area at the center of the park, Detective Johnson 
noticed Ms. Garcia circling on her bike. R.191:161-162. While he could not recall 
whether Ms. Garcia was communicating with anyone else, Detective Johnson testified 
that she was in the company of three to five other individuals. R.191:161-162. Ms. 
Garcia first approached Detective Johnson on her bike while the other individuals were 
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five to fifteen feet away—though feasibly closer according to the detective's testimony. 
R.191:163. 
In the area northwest of the bathrooms, Ms. Garcia stopped her bike and 
approached the detective. R. 191:163. It is not certain what Ms. Garcia first asked 
Detective Johnson. R.191:165; 167. At the preliminary hearing held on February 10, 
2011, the detective recalled that Ms. Garcia inquired "What are you looking for?" R.130-
131; R. 191:165. At trial, over eight months later, Detective Johnson testified that she 
asked "How much do you need?" or "How much do you want?" R.191:143; 165. 
Though the transmitter worn by Detective Johnson was capable of recording the 
exchange, audio and/or video technology it was not used as a part of the operation to 
confirm the precise language spoken. R.191:152-153. Relying on his experience as an 
undercover narcotics detective, Detective Johnson stated that it is common for individuals 
to explicitly ask "Do you want drugs?" R.191:178. However, he testified that an 
ambiguous phrase such as "What do you want?" "What do you need?" or "What are you 
looking for?" was sufficient to suggest Ms. Garcia was offering an opportunity to 
purchase drugs. R. 191:166. 
In response to Ms. Garcia's initial inquiry, the detective responded that he needed 
"40 white." R.191:143. Detective Johnson spoke only in slang and never explicitly said 
"cocaine" in Ms. Garcia's presence. R.191:143; 176. During this initial exchange, two 
women meandered nearby, ambling closer at some points, and farther away at other 
points. R.191:164-165. Detective Johnson was unable to recall whether Ms. Garcia and 
these two women interacted. R. 191:165. 
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After the detective requested "40 white," Ms. Garcia gestured with her hand and 
shouted "quarenta"—meaning "40" in Spanish—in the direction of a Hispanic man 
standing approximately 25-30 feet away. R.191:143-44. At this time, several individuals 
were in the same vicinity at various indeterminate locations. R.191:167. Taking 
precaution, Detective Johnson watched intently as the Hispanic man approached. 
R.191:168. As the Hispanic gentlemen proceeded toward him, the detective testified that 
Ms. Garcia stood straddling her bike while in the presence of several other individuals. 
R.191:169. These individuals stood only a few feet away from the detective, and 
watched the transaction. R. 191:169. Detective Johnson was unable to recall whether Ms. 
Garcia interacted with the onlookers during this time. R. 191:169. 
After being handed two prerecorded twenty dollar bills, the Hispanic man spit out 
two small twists of cocaine and passed them to the detective. R. 191:170. Following the 
exchange, Ms. Garcia, the Hispanic male, and Detective Johnson exited the park in 
separate directions. R. 191:171. Beyond the gesture and "quarenta" statement, Detective 
Johnson observed no further interaction between Ms. Garcia and the Hispanic male. 
R.191:174. Additionally, Ms. Garcia and the detective shared no further contact. 
R.191:171; 174. Detective Johnson testified that "middlemen" commonly arrange drug 
deals to receive certain benefits—either to collect money for facilitating the transaction, 
or to receive a share of the drugs from the purchase. R.191:146. Ms. Garcia did not ask 
the detective for any money or drugs following the transaction. R.191:146-147; 174. 
When Ms. Garcia and the Hispanic male were at a safe distance away, Detective 
Johnson executed the bust signal in order to prompt supporting officers to arrest the 
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suspects. R. 191:147; 171. The Hispanic male was arrested east of the park on 400 South 
with the pre-recorded twenty dollar bills found on his person. R. 191:172-173. 
Meanwhile, the police arrested Ms. Garcia northwest of the park at 240 South and 400 
West. R. 191:173; 175. The Wiggam Center, also positioned northwest of the park, was 
only a short distance away from her arrest location. R. 191:191. No prerecorded bills or 
drugs were recovered from Ms. Garcia. R. 191:174-175. 
About five minutes after her arrest, Detective Johnson identified Ms. Garcia 
before she was booked into jail. R.191:176. Cynthia testified that she received a call 
from her aunt, who was already in jail, at approximately 11:00 a.m. or 11:15 a.m. 
R.191:193. Later that afternoon, Detective Johnson drafted a report describing the events 
that surrounded Ms. Garcia's arrest. R.191:177. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse Ms. Garcia's conviction where the marshaled evidence 
establishes the State failed to meet its burden. The evidence presented failed to prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Garcia knowingly and intentionally arranged to 
distribute crack cocaine. Furthermore, the insufficiency of the evidence constituted plain 
error, which should have been obvious to the trial court, the absence of which was 
reasonably likely to produce a more favorable outcome for Ms. Garcia. 
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ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE MARSHALED 
EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE 
DOUBT THAT GARCIA WAS GUILTY OF THE CHARGED OFFENSE. 
This Court will "reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when" it concludes 
"as a matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction." State v. 
Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ^ [10, 2 P.3d 954 (citation and quotation omitted). It will 
"view the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict," and "will reverse only if 
the evidence is so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crimes.'" Id. 
(citations and quotations omitted). Though the burden of establishing insufficiency of the 
evidence "is high," however, "it is not impossible." Id. (citations omitted). This Court 
"will not make speculative leaps across gaps in the evidence." Id. (citations and 
quotations omitted). "Every element of the crime charged must be proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Id. (citation and quotations omitted). In other words, "[t]o affirm the 
jury's verdict," this Court "must be sure the State has introduced evidence sufficient to 
support all elements of the charged crime." Id. (citation and quotation omitted); see also 
Holgate, 2000 UT 74 at f 18; State v. Leleae, 1999 UT App 368, ^ [17, 993 P.2d 232. 
When raising an insufficient evidence claim, the defendant "must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, ^ j 13, 
25 P.3d 985 (citations and quotations omitted). Proper marshaling requires the challenger 
to present "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
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introduced which supports the very findings the appellant resists." West Valley City v. 
Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis in original); see 
also State v. Maese, 2010 UT App 106, ffl[ 16-17, 236 P.3d 155. "After constructing this 
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal flaw in 
the evidence." Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315; see also Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT 
App233,1J20n.5,2l7P.3d733. 
As it reviews the marshaled evidence, this Court will "not sit as a second trier of 
fact." Boyd, 2001 UT 30 % 16. Thus, "[s]o long as there is some evidence, including 
reasonable inferences, from which findings of all the requisite elements of the crime can 
reasonably be made, [this Court's] inquiry stops." Id. Instead, this Court will simply 
"assume that the jury believed the evidence supporting the verdict." Id. (quotations and 
citation omitted); see State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, ^ 30, 989 P.2d 1091 ("We may 
not weigh evidence or assess witness credibility, but instead 'assume that the jury 
believed the evidence and inferences that support the verdict'"). 
As demonstrated below, the marshaled evidence shows that the State presented 
insufficient evidence to show Garcia knowingly and intentionally arranged to distribute a 
controlled substance. 
A. The Marshaled Evidence Supporting the Verdict 
Under Utah law distribution or arrangement to distribute a controlled substance is 
defined in part as follows: 
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally:... 
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(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance. 
Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8(1) (2010). "To make out a prima facie case under the statute, 
the State must show that an offer, agreement, consent, or arrangement to distribute 
controlled substances was made by the defendant and, whichever variation or variations it 
charges, that the behavior was 'engaged in knowingly or with intent that such distribution 
would, or would be likely to, occur."' State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159, If 9, 3 P.3d 725 
{abrogated on other grounds by State v. Morales-Torres, 2001 UT App 246, 2001 WL 
911418), citing State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 923 (Utah 1979); see also State v. 
Gallegos, 851 P.2d 1185, 1190 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). "[I]f [s]he intends the distribution 
for sale of a controlled substance, any act in furtherance of an arrangement therefor 
constitutes the criminal offense described by the statute." Harrison, 601 P.2d at 924; 
State v. Gray, 111 P.2d 1313, 1320-21 (Utah 1986). 
Here, the marshaled evidence was "so inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" that Ms.Garcia intended to 
arrange the distribution of a controlled substance. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ^ | 10 
(quotation omitted). Detective Johnson testified that he arrived undercover at Pioneer 
Park on December 9, 2010 between the hours of 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. R.191:141-
142; 162. Meanwhile, Ms. Garcia's niece, Cynthia Nicole Garcia, testified that her aunt 
left her home at 850 Roberta Street around 9:30 a.m. that same morning. R.191:191. 
Before leaving, Ms. Garcia informed her niece that she planned to ride her bicycle to the 
Wiggam Center to check on the status of her birth certificate. R.191:190-191. She further 
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testified that Ms. Garcia was in a hurry to return home because the women had plans to 
go Christmas shopping later that morning. R. 191:192-193. 
In the center of the park, Detective Johnson first noticed Ms. Garcia circling on 
her bike amongst three to five other individuals in the area. R. 191:161-162. The detective 
could not recall if Ms. Garcia was communicating with these individuals. R. 191:161-162. 
Ms. Garcia initiated contact with Detective Johnson and made an indeterminate inquiry. 
R. 191:163. At the preliminary hearing, Detective Johnson recalled that Ms. Garcia asked 
"What are you looking for?" while at trial he testified that she inquired "Flow much do 
you need?" or "How much do you want?" R.130-131; R.191:143; 165. During their first 
encounter, two women were nearby and moved closer at some points, and farther away at 
other points. R. 191:164-165. 
The detective assumed that Ms. Garcia was indirectly offering drugs, and 
responded in slang that he needed "40 white." R. 191:143. Following his request, Ms. 
Garcia gestured with her hand and shouted "quarenta"—meaning "40" in Spanish—in the 
direction of a Hispanic man standing 25-30 feet away. R. 191:143-44. The detective 
testified that there were other people in the area of the Hispanic male, but he could not 
recall if anyone stood between Ms. Garcia and this man. R. 191:167. The Hispanic man 
approached, and Detective Johnson handed him two prerecorded twenty dollar bills. 
R.191:170. The man spat out two small twists of cocaine and handed them to the 
detective. R.191:170. During the transaction, Ms. Garcia stood straddling her bike whilst 
in the company of several other observers who stood a few feet away. R. 191:169. 
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Detective Johnson was unable to recall whether Ms. Garcia interacted with the onlookers. 
R.191:169. 
Subsequently, Ms. Garcia, the Hispanic male, and Detective Johnson exited the 
park in separate directions and shared no further contact. R.191:171; 174. The Hispanic 
male was arrested east of the park on 400 South with the pre-recorded twenty dollar bills 
found in his possession. R. 191:172-173. Ms. Garcia was arrested a half a block away 
from the Wiggam Center at 240 South and 400 West. R. 191:173; 175. At the time of her 
arrest, the police did not find any drugs or prerecorded bills on Ms. Garcia's person. 
R.191:174-175. 
B. The Evidence Presented Was Not Sufficient To Show That Ms. Garcia Distributed 
or Arranged To Distribute A Controlled Substance. 
In order for the State to sustain a conviction for a first degree felony it had to 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Garcia knowingly or intentionally committed 
some "act in furtherance of an arrangement" to distribute a controlled substance. 
Harrison, 601 P.2d at 924. The marshaled evidence, however, was so "inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" 
that Ms. Garcia knowingly or intentionally arranged for the distribution of a controlled 
substance. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, If 10 (citations and quotations omitted). 
The evidence is insufficient to prove that Ms. Garcia had the requisite knowledge 
or intent because it requires a "speculative leap[] across [a] gap[] in the evidence." 
Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ^  10. Specifically, there is no evidence to support that Ms. 
Garcia knew "40 white" was slang for cocaine and that she knew the Hispanic male dealt 
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illegal drugs. Instead, the evidence suggests that Ms. Garcia had no relationship with the 
Hispanic male, and was merely solicited to translate for unknown individuals while 
traveling through the park to the Wiggam Center. 
When Detective Johnson first noticed Ms. Garcia circling on her bike, she was in 
the company of three to five other individuals. R.191:161-162. However, the detective 
was unable recall if she was talking with these other people. R.191:161-162. When Ms. 
Garcia asked the detective either "What are you looking for?" "How much do you need?" 
or "How much do you want?" two women moved around them—walking closer at some 
points, and farther away at other points. R.191:164-165. These actions cast doubt on any 
assumption that the women were uninterested bystanders. While Ms. Garcia queried in 
English, she translated the detective's request for "40 white" into Spanish. R.191:143-
144. Because the detective did not mention drugs or cocaine in Ms. Garcia's presence, 
there was no opportunity for her to equate "40 white" with cocaine. R.191:143; 176. As 
the Hispanic male handed the cocaine to the Detective, several individuals stood in place 
merely a few feet away. R.191:169. At this point, "reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt" that these other individuals were uninvolved in the 
transaction. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, *| 10. Instead, this evidence suggests that Ms. 
Garcia was acting as a translator for these unknown individuals, and was only parroting 
words without understanding the illicit meaning of "40 white." 
Further, other than calling "quarenta" and gesturing in the Hispanic male's general 
direction, there is no evidence that Ms. Garcia and this man shared any relationship. After 
the exchange was complete, Ms. Garcia, the Detective, and the Hispanic male departed in 
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separate directions. R. 191:171. Additionally, Ms. Garcia demonstrated indifference to the 
Hispanic male and the entire transaction in general. Supporting evidence shows that she 
remained on her bike for the duration of the encounter, left the park immediately after the 
exchange, and did not ask the Detective for a share of money or drugs for facilitating the 
transaction. R.191:169; 171; 174. 
Lastly, the temporal and locational specifics do not lend support to the assumption 
that Ms. Garcia knew the Hispanic male, and traveled to Pioneer Park to arrange a drug 
deal with him that morning. Ms. Garcia left her house around 9:30 am to check on the 
status of her birth certificate at the Wiggam Center. R. 191:190-191. In a hurry to return 
for a Christmas shopping engagement with her niece, Ms. Garcia rode her bicycle though 
Pioneer Park— a convenient short cut to the Wiggam Center from her home at 850 
Roberta Street. R. 191:191-193. Furthermore, after the transaction was complete, Ms. 
Garcia was arrested only a half a block from her destination. R. 191:191; 173; 175. In 
light of the facts above, reasonable minds would have had a reasonable doubt that Ms. 
Garcia knew the meaning of "40 white," and knew the Hispanic male was a drug dealer. 
Alternatively, even if Ms. Garcia was not acting as a translator, reasonable minds 
would still entertain a reasonable doubt that Ms. Garcia knew "40 white" was a code 
word for cocaine and knew the Hispanic man was a drug dealer. Namely, the State 
required the jury to speculate that Ms. Garcia's initial inquiry was an offer to purchase 
drugs, and that she specifically intended to gesture the Hispanic male over. 
First, reasonable minds would have entertained a reasonable doubt that Ms. Garcia 
intentionally offered the Detective an opportunity to purchase drugs. Though the 
15 
exchange was limited to three short phrases—"40 white," "quarenta," and Ms. Garcia's 
unknown initial inquiry—Detective Johnson was not able to recall what Ms. Garcia asked 
when she first approached him. R.191:143-144; 165. Instead, the jury was forced to rely 
on the Detective's faded recollections of the dialog. At the preliminary hearing, the 
detective recalled that Ms. Garcia asked "What are you looking for?" R.130-131; 
R. 191:165. At trial, over eight months later, Detective Johnson testified that she asked 
"How much do you need," or "How much do you want?" R. 191:143; 165. The two 
phrases carry drastically different meanings in context. "What are you looking for?" is an 
innocuous inquiry, and an appropriate question to ask a stranger who appears confused. 
Meanwhile, the phrases "How much do you need?" or "How much do you want?" are 
more indicative of an offer to purchase drugs and could support a reasonable inference 
that Ms. Garcia understood the meaning of "40 white." Instead of clarifying the nature of 
Ms. Garcia's initial inquiry, the State required the jury to make a "speculative leap" over 
this gap in the evidence. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, ^ j 10. 
Second, the jury was not provided with the evidence required to formulate a 
reasonable inference that Ms. Garcia intended to summon the Hispanic male over. There 
is no evidence that Ms. Garcia and the Hispanic male knew each other or had any contact 
prior to or after the transaction. R.191:174. Also, the Detective was unable to recall 
whether anyone stood in between Ms. Garcia and the Hispanic man when "quarenta" was 
called and the gesture was made. R. 191:167. However, he did testify that there were 
people in the immediate vicinity. R. 191:167. Here, the jury was required to speculate that 
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Ms.Garcia intended to signal the Hispanic male and not one of the other individuals also 
in the same area. 
The evidence presented by the State supporting the arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance charge was so "inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that [Ms. Garcia] committed 
the crime." Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136, U 10 (quotation omitted). Because the State did 
not prove that Ms. Garcia formed the requisite knowledge or intent to arrange a drug 
transaction, the State failed to "prove [the] criminal act beyond a reasonable doubt." State 
v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 211,214 (Utah 1985). Specifically, the State failed to prove that Ms. 
Garcia understood "40 white" to mean cocaine and that she knew the Hispanic male dealt 
cocaine. Therefore, Ms. Garcia's conviction for arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance should be reversed. 
C. In the Alternative, Ms. Garcia's Conviction Should Be Overturned for Plain Error. 
It was plain error to allow Ms. Garcia's conviction on obviously insufficient 
evidence. The plain error doctrine can serve as an alternative to an insufficiency of the 
evidence claim when the claim is not preserved at trial. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, Tf 11. It 
"enables the appellate court to balance the need for procedural regularity with the 
demands of fairness" and "to avoid injustice." Id. f 13 (internal quotations and citations 
omitted). 
To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that (i) an error 
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the 
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a 
more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased differently, our 
confidence in the verdict is undermined. 
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Id. (citation and quotation omitted). 
First, Ms. Garcia's conviction was based on insufficient evidence, as argued 
above, which constitutes error. Id. ^ 17. Second, this error was uso obvious and 
fundamental that it was plain error to submit the case to the jury." Id. ^ 18. Here, the case 
law was well settled that the State can prove intent through circumstantial evidence, as 
long as there was "sufficient evidence, including . . . inferences that could be drawn 
therefrom," that the defendant possessed the requisite intent. Id, ffl| 21-22. However, such 
inferences must "have a basis in logic and reasonable human experience." Id. TJ 21. As set 
forth above, the State's evidence required the inference that Ms. Garcia understood what 
the term "40 white" to mean cocaine, and, conveyed that understanding by translating 
that term in Spanish and gesturing to the Hispanic man. Given the evidence, this 
inference is contrary to "logic and reasonable human experience." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, 
121. 
For the reasons argued above, it should have been obvious to the trial court that 
the inferences drawn by the State's insufficient evidence lacked a basis in logic and 
human experience necessary to prove Ms. Garcia's intent. Lastly, the error was harmful 
and "of such a magnitude that there is reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome 
for [Ms. Garcia]." State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, U 16, 20 P.3d 888. An error is harmful if it 
is prejudicial, and the error is prejudicial if but for the trial court's allowance of 
insufficient evidence, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See State v. 
Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^ 22, 95 P.3d 276. Clearly, but for the trial court's allowance of 
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insufficient evidence by the State, the result of the proceeding would have been very 
different for Ms. Garcia. Had the trial court recognized this error, it would have 
"forthwith order[ed the defendant] discharged." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, U 15. 
For these reasons, the court committed plain error with regard to the insufficiency 
of the evidence against Ms. Garcia. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Ms. Garcia respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse her conviction for distributing or arranging to distribute a controlled substance. 
SUBMITTED this ^ 0 day of July, 2012. 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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